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INTRODUCTION
In Delaware, minority shareholders are a vulnerable category
deserving special protections.
That is for good reason: minority
shareholders, by definition, are part-owners of companies whose affairs are
subject to the influence of controlling shareholders. In these companies,
the controlling shareholder has preponderant power because it holds most
of the stock. Such power is difficult to check. Hence, Delaware courts
have been––and remain––wary of actions taken by controlling
shareholders. 1

1. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (warning that the
“specter of impropriety can never be completely eradicated” in going-private mergers, and
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While this wariness has been consistent, the law surrounding
controlling-shareholder actions has not. And in the context of parentsubsidiary mergers––or “going-private mergers”––the case law has been a
battlefield rife with uncertainty for all parties involved. However, on
March 14, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court extended an olive branch to
those feuding. The olive branch, in actuality, was the opinion provided in
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corporation. 2 In M&F Worldwide (“MFW II”),
the supreme court embraced Chancellor Strine’s controversial chancery
court decision In re MFW Shareholders Litigation (“MFW I”), which held
that if a going-private merger is approved by both a special committee of
independent directors and a majority of the minority shareholders, the
business judgment rule (“BJR”) will be the standard of review governing
the transaction, rather than entire fairness. 3
Background is required in order to appreciate the magnitude of this
event. When a controlling shareholder executes a going-private merger by
acquiring the remaining stock in the company it controls, the process is ripe
for abuse. That is because the controlling shareholder sits on both sides of
the transaction. It sits on one side of the transaction, since it is the party
proposing the merger. The controlling shareholder sits on the other side of
the transaction, since it has elected the majority of the target company’s
board, which must vote in favor of the merger for it to go through. Because
the board is under the controlling shareholder’s thumb, the controlling
shareholder, in effect, is the party that is both proposing and approving the
merger.
Accordingly, unless strict procedures are followed, going-private
mergers constitute what Delaware and other courts term “self-dealing.” 4
Self-dealing poses a risk for minority shareholders because there is a
realistic likelihood that the controlling shareholder will be primarily
focused on its own interests while carrying out the transaction. The classic
scenario of abuse is when the controlling shareholder, “by virtue of its
domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that

additional judicial scrutiny is thus warranted); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical
Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 509 (2002)
(describing how “this strain of thought [embodied in Tremont] was premised on the notion
that when an 800-pound gorilla wants the rest of the bananas, little chimpanzees, like
independent directors and minority stockholders, cannot be expected to stand in the way,
even if the gorilla putatively gives them veto power”).
2. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
3. 67 A.3d 496, 524-36 (Del. Ch. 2013).
4. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (explaining
that self-dealing occurs when a parent sits on both sides of a transaction with its subsidiary).

WILSON_FINAL (ARTICLE 7) .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

DESIRABLE RESISTANCE

3/26/2015 5:47 PM

645

the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and
detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary.” 5
Because of the potential for abuse in going-private mergers, Delaware
courts have, as a matter of course, employed entire fairness as the standard
of review, pointing at Kahn v. Lynch as the doctrinal justification.6 In
Lynch, 7 the Delaware Supreme Court held that if a going-private merger is
negotiated and recommended by a special, independent committee formed
from members of the subsidiary’s board, the merger is subject to the entire
fairness standard. 8 Entire fairness is invasive because it entails scrutinizing
all aspects of the transaction––both procedural and substantive––without
deference to the controlling shareholder.9 Moreover, Lynch suggested that
even if the merger was also approved by a majority of the minority
shareholders, the standard of review would remain the same. 10 The court
thus led controlling shareholders to believe that they could not evade the
entire fairness standard for judicial review of going-private mergers.
Spawning from this belief has been the dominance of a transaction
structure in which the going-private merger is negotiated and recommended
by a special committee––something Lynch ruled was enough to shift the
burden onto the plaintiffs to show that the merger was not entirely fair.11
However, the controlling shareholder demands nothing more, since it likely
faces entire fairness regardless of the procedures it follows. 12
However, in 2013 Chancellor Strine issued his opinion in MFW I,
which forcefully challenged the status quo. MFW I held that if a goingprivate merger is conditioned from the outset on approval by both a special,
independent committee, fully empowered to reject the deal, and the
majority of the minority shareholders, the ultra-lax business judgment rule
will apply. 13 Since the opinion came from the chancery court, it
represented an insurrection against Lynch’s hegemony. When forced to
determine the fate of the insurrection, the Delaware Supreme Court gave its
approval and blessed Chancellor Strine’s bold decision. 14
5. Id.
6. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
7. Since there are many cases with “Kahn” as the first-named party, “Lynch” is how
this case is conventionally referred to in the case law and otherwise.
8. Id. at 1117.
9. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
10. Id.
11. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117.
12. Id.
13. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 500 (Del. Ch. 2013).
14. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (holding that the
business judgment rule is the standard of review that governs going-private mergers
between the controlling stockholder and its corporate subsidiary when the merger is
conditioned on both the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered special
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In this comment, I endorse the Delaware Supreme Court’s choice to
uphold MFW I and demonstrate that it is part of a broader, desirable trend
of pushback against Lynch––pushback principally arising from the
chancery court. I first highlight the differences between the BJR and entire
fairness standards of review. Second, I summarize the chancery court’s
opinion in MFW I. Third, I summarize the Delaware Supreme Court’s
opinion in MFW II. Fourth, I argue that MFW I and MFW II are best
understood as a culmination of a larger movement in the case law, which
reflected that Lynch, as commonly interpreted in the going-private merger
context, was untenable.
In the fifth section, I identify the reasons why it was proper, as a
matter of law and policy, for the Delaware Supreme Court to uphold
Chancellor Strine’s decision. Specifically, I contend that upholding MFW I
was necessary to reconcile the tension between the standard practice of
applying the BJR to going-private tender offers and entire fairness to
going-private mergers, despite the practical similarities between the two
transactions. Furthermore, because of MFW II, there will now be an
incentive for controlling shareholders to structure going-private mergers in
a manner ideal for protecting minority shareholders. Finally, MFW II will
initiate a positive change in the realm of securities litigation by deterring
frivolous lawsuits. In sum, these reasons serve as a strong defense of the
recent Delaware Supreme Court opinion.
I.

THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE OR ENTIRE FAIRNESS: WHY
DOES IT MATTER?

The crux of MFW I and MFW II was the selection of the BJR over
entire fairness as the appropriate level of scrutiny for going-private
mergers. In order to understand the implications of this choice, it is
important to discern the differences between the two principles. Indeed,
given the stark differences between the BJR and entire fairness, “[i]t is
often of critical importance whether a particular decision is one to which
the business judgment rule applies or the entire fairness rule applies.”15
The BJR is the most relaxed standard of review that a court can apply to a
corporate action. It is essentially a standard of corporate liability by which
a court reviews the actions of the members of a board of directors, who are
bound by a “triad” of fiduciary duties: care, good faith, and loyalty. 16 The
committee that fulfills its duty of care, and the informed, uncoerced vote of a majority of
minority stockholders).
15. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993).
16. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). The duty of good
faith is technically a subset of the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362,
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BJR is predicated on the idea that boards of directors, unlike courts,
possess expertise in their areas of business, and the courts should afford
them wide latitude in making decisions. 17 Accordingly, the BJR is a
presumption that, in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company. 18
Moreover, the court presumes that the decision did not constitute fraud,
illegality, ultra vires conduct, or waste.19
To rebut the presumption, a shareholder “assumes the burden of
providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision,
breached . . . their fiduciary duty [of] good faith, loyalty, or due care.”20 To
do so is very difficult; not even a showing of gross negligence is
sufficient. 21 Instead, a plaintiff must prove that a director or officer
knowingly shirked his or her duties by, for example, “intentionally act[ing]
with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the
corporation . . . act[ing] with the intent to violate applicable positive law,
or . . . fail[ing] to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a
conscious disregard for his duties.”22 Put simply, the court will not disturb
a director or officer’s decision “if they can be attributed to any rational
business purpose.” 23 If a plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the BJR
attaches to protect corporate officers.24 Given that the BJR bars meaningful
judicial review of a corporation’s decisions and that it will attach absent
extraordinary circumstances, the main effect of the BJR is to insulate
corporations from liability. 25
By contrast, entire fairness is the most exacting standard of judicial
review in Delaware. As its name suggests, in applying entire fairness, the

370 (Del. 2006) (noting that “the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a
financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where
the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”).
17. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 804, 811 (Del. 1984) (remarking that the
BJR reflects the “cardinal precept . . . that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the
business and affairs of the corporation”).
18. Id. at 812.
19. Id.
20. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
21. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66-68 (Del. 2006)
(emphasizing how a showing of gross negligence is inadequate for rebutting the BJR).
22. Id. at 67 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
23. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (emphasis added).
24. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
25. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (remarking that “liability
is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this
reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally
labelled [sic] the business judgment rule”).
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court must determine whether the challenged decision was entirely fair for
the shareholders. 26 To do so, there must be an “examination of all aspects
of the transaction,” 27 with an eye to both procedural fairness and
substantive fairness. 28 Procedural fairness “embraces questions of when
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated,
disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained.” 29 Substantive fairness “relates to the
economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including
all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and
any other elements that affect the . . . value of a company’s stock.” 30 Under
entire fairness, the burden is initially on the defendant. 31 However, if the
defendant demonstrates that a well-functioning special committee of
independent directors or a fully informed and uncoerced majority of the
shareholders approved the transaction, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show that the transaction was not entirely fair. 32
II.

MFW I

In MFW I, the Delaware Chancery Court confronted a question of first
impression: what standard of review should apply to a going-private
merger conditioned from the outset by the controlling stockholder “on . . .
both a properly empowered, independent committee and an informed,
uncoerced majority-of-the minority vote . . . .” 33 The choice was between
the highly deferential BJR, which, absent extraordinary circumstances,
would prevent the court from second guessing the actions of the controlling
shareholder, and the plaintiff-friendly entire fairness standard. 34 The
controlling shareholder was MacAndrews & Forbes (“MacAndrews”), a
holding company incorporated in Delaware.35 After purchasing the rest of
the shares in MFW, its subsidiary, MacAndrews and members of MFW’s
board were sued by a collection of former MFW shareholders, who had

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1995).
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
Id.
Id.
Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994). .
Id.
67 A.3d 496, 500 (Del. Ch. 2013) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 523 n.131 (citing Tremont, 694 A.2d at 428).
Id. at 499.
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been squeezed out by the deal.36 The plaintiffs sought post-closing
damages for breach of fiduciary duty. 37
Before the merger at issue, MacAndrews owned 43.4% of MFW. 38
MacAndrews itself was owned entirely by Ron Perelman. 39 In May 2011,
MacAndrews began exploring the possibility of taking MFW private.40
MacAndrews hired an investment bank for advice on the issue, and the
bank valued MFW’s shares at ten to thirty-two dollars a share. 41 At the
time, MFW was trading on the New York Stock Exchange in the twenty to
twenty-four dollar range. 42 By June 10, 2011, MFW’s shares closed at
$16.96. 43 The following business day, MacAndrews sent a proposal to the
MFW board to buy the remaining shares for $24 in cash. 44
Critically, the proposal stipulated that MFW “will not move forward
with the transaction unless it is approved by . . . a special committee [of
independent MFW directors]. . . . [T]he transaction will be subject to a nonwaivable condition requiring the approval of a majority of the shares of the
Company not owned by [MacAndrews].” 45 The special committee was
expected to objectively assess the merits of the deal for the minority
shareholders and make a recommendation to them as to whether they
should vote for or against it. 46 MacAndrews emphasized that, whatever the
recommendation of the committee, MacAndrews would maintain a positive
relationship with MFW and remain a long-term stockholder. 47
In view of the proposal, the MFW board formed a special committee
of independent directors and empowered it to: (1) investigate and evaluate
MacAndrew’s proposal, (2) negotiate with MacAndrews over the terms of
the transaction, subject to the understanding that the MFW board would
need to approve any final agreement, and (3) make recommendations to the
board and provide conclusions about whether the transaction is fair and in
the best interest of the minority shareholders. 48 The board agreed that it
would not approve the transaction without a prior favorable
recommendation of the special committee.49 It also permitted the
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 506.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Id.
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committee to hire its own legal and financial advisers to assist in the
undertaking. 50
So empowered, the committee went to work immediately,
interviewing several potential financial advisers, before settling on
Evercore Partners. 51 With its financial adviser, the committee requested
and received the most up-to-date financial data from MFW. 52 Armed with
the data, Evercore used sound accounting methods to generate a multitude
of valuations of MFW in order to analyze the fairness of MacAndrews’
offer. 53 After determining that MFW had been lowballed by MacAndrews,
the special committee rejected the $24/share offer and counter-offered with
$30/share. 54 MacAndrews rejected the counteroffer, but, after some debate,
made a “best and final” offer to MFW for $25/share. 55 At the committee’s
eighth and final meeting, Evercore declared that the price was fair. 56 Based
on this, the committee unanimously accepted the offer, and recommended
it to the board. 57 After the three board members affiliated with
MacAndrews recused themselves, the eight other members also voted
unanimously to accept MacAndrews’ offer. 58 Given the committee’s
conduct, the court ruled that “[t]he record is clear that the special
committee met frequently and was presented with a rich body of financial
information relevant to whether and at what price a going private
transaction was advisable . . . .” 59 Thus, “there is no triable issue of fact as
to [the special committee’s] satisfaction of its duty of care.” 60 Moreover,
the composition of the committee was such that there was no uncertainty as
to whether the committee was truly independent from MacAndrews.61
Shortly after MFW’s board accepted MacAndrews’ offer, the
stockholders were provided a proxy statement containing the history of the
merger, including a summary of the negotiations between the special
committee and MacAndrews, five separate ranges for the value of MFW’s
stock that Evercore had produced using different financial analyses, and a
recommendation that they vote in favor of the transaction.62 When the
votes were counted on December 21, 2011, 65% of the shareholders other
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 514-15.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 515-16.
Id. at 516.
Id.
Id. at 517-18.
Id. at 516.
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than MacAndrews––i.e., 65% of the minority shareholders––voted to
accept the offer.63 In reviewing the vote, the court concluded that there was
no triable issue of fact regarding whether the vote was fully informed and
uncoerced––a point that the plaintiffs did not dispute.64
In light of the special committee’s independence, the legitimacy of the
minority shareholders’ vote, and the requirement that both conditions were
necessary for the transaction, the court then considered what standard of
review was appropriate. Although the plaintiffs admitted that the Delaware
Supreme Court had not directly answered this query, they nevertheless
contended that its precedent demanded entire fairness. 65 The plaintiffs
cited the language in the ever-influential Lynch that commanded that a
“controlling or dominating shareholder standing on both sides of a
transaction, as in a parent-subsidiary context, bears the burden of proving
its entire fairness.” 66 The plaintiffs argued that this language was not only
by itself sufficient to control the outcome of MFW I, but also the
underlying principle had been affirmed in three subsequent supreme court
cases, 67 including Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 68 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 69
and Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault (AMC). 70
Chancellor Strine denied that these four cases individually or
collectively controlled MFW I. Although the language from Lynch
ostensibly mandated entire fairness, the court observed that the goingprivate merger in Lynch was distinguishable because it was conditioned
only on the approval of the special committee, not on the approval of the
minority shareholders as well.71 Moreover, the special committee in Lynch,
unlike MFW’s, was not capable of rejecting the transaction, since the
controlling shareholder threatened to bypass the committee and make a
tender offer to the minority shareholders at a lower price if the committee
said no. 72 Thus, Lynch was distinguishable from MFW I’s facts. 73 The
same could be said for Tremont and Emerald Partners, since the goingprivate transactions in those cases also were not conditioned on the
approval of the minority stockholders, but rather only on the special

63.
64.
65.
66.
1994)).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 520.
Id. (quoting Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del.
Id.
694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997).
726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999).
51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012).
MFW, 67 A.3d at 522.
Id. (citing Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1118).
Id.
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committee’s approval. 74 Finally, while it is true that AMC broadly
proclaimed that “[w]hen a transaction involving self-dealing by a
controlling shareholder is challenged, the applicable standard of judicial
review is entire fairness,” 75 the chancery court noted that the defendants
had explicitly eschewed any argument that any standard of review other
than entire fairness applied. 76 Because the issue was not brought up in the
chancery court, 77 the Delaware Supreme Court in AMC did not need to
consider the question presented in MFW I. Since no Delaware Supreme
Court precedent controlled, the MFW I court concluded that it had a free
hand in choosing the outcome of the case.78
With its free hand, the court pulled away from the general tradition of
entire fairness in going-private mergers and decided that the BJR should
apply. 79 The court referenced the broad preference of the Delaware
judiciary, which is not expert in business affairs, to defer to experienced
directors and knowledgeable shareholders, whose money is at stake.80 This
deference takes the form of the BJR, which is common to transactions that
are not going-private mergers. 81 Second, the dual protections for minority
shareholders instituted by MacAndrews––approval by a special committee
and vote by the majority of the minority shareholders––create an ideal
model for going-private mergers, since each uniquely shields minority
shareholders against abuse by the controlling shareholder.82 However,
controlling shareholders would have no incentive to take both measures if
their transactions were subject to entire fairness––the standard of review
that would apply had they taken only one measure. 83 Therefore, the BJR
can be extended as a carrot to controlling shareholders so that, despite the
added costs, they will structure going-private mergers in a way highly
beneficial to minority shareholders.84 Third, and relatedly, the usual
wariness of self-interested transactions that has led Delaware courts in

74. Id. at 523 (citing Tremont, 694 A.2d at 429-30); The M&F Defendants’ Reply
Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, MFW, 67 A.3d 496 (Del.
2013) (No. 6566-CS).
75. AMC, 51 A.3d at 1213.
76. MFW, 67 A.3d at 523-24 (citing In re Southern Peru Copper Corp. S’holder
Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 766 (Del. Ch. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Americas Mining Corp.
v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012)).
77. Id. at 524.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 527-28.
80. Id. at 526.
81. Id. at 527.
82. Id. at 527-28.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 528-29.
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other contexts to routinely apply entire fairness has no place here. 85 While
abuse by controlling shareholders is indeed a palpable risk when robust
safeguards do not exist, the presence of a strong special committee and
majority of minority voting largely eliminates the chances of such abuse.86
Thus, the court ruled that the merger between MFW and MacAndrews
should be viewed through the lens of the BJR. 87
Since the BJR all but guarantees that a transaction under scrutiny will
get the court’s seal of approval, Chancellor Strine preemptively stressed
that the decision was not a broad fiat to corporations to freeze out minority
shareholders without meaningful judicial oversight by simply asking for
approval by a special committee and the majority of the minority. 88
Instead, to enjoy the laxity of the BJR: (1) the controlling shareholder must
condition from the outset the procession of the deal on these two measures;
(2) the special committee must be independent; (3) the committee must be
empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitively; (4)
the committee must meet its duty of care; (5) the vote of the minority must
be informed; and (6) there must be no coercion of the minority. 89 Only
then will the BJR apply.
Turning to the merits of the plaintiffs’ case, Chancellor Strine applied
the BJR and awarded summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. 90
The plaintiffs appealed the decision and the Delaware Supreme Court heard
their appeal in MFW II.
III.

MFW II

In MFW II, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld Chancellor Strine’s
opinion at the chancery court. It affirmed that the BJR is the standard of
review that should govern mergers between a controlling shareholder and
its subsidiary, “where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both
approval by an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee
that fulfills its duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority
of the minority stockholders.” 91 The court rested its decision on four
considerations. First, the court noted that “entire fairness is the highest
standard of review in corporate law,” and is appropriate when a controlling
shareholder has potentially undermined the protections afforded by a

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 528-29, 532-33, 535.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 533-36.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 536.
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).
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disinterested board and shareholder approval. 92 Yet, that “undermining
influence does not exist in every controlled merger setting,” and “[t]he
simultaneous deployment of the procedural protections employed [by the
defendant] here create[s] a countervailing, offsetting influence of equal––if
not greater––force.” 93 That is, when the controller “irrevocably and
publicly disables itself from using its control to dictate the outcome of the
negotiations and shareholder vote,” the going-private merger acquires the
characteristics of a third-party, arm’s-length merger, which is reviewed
under the BJR. 94
Second, the court agreed with Chancellor Strine that the merger
structure encouraged by MFW I “optimally protects” the minority
shareholders in a going-private merger. 95 Third, the use of the BJR as the
standard of review in a going-private merger conditioned on approval by
both a special committee and the majority-of-the-minority shareholders “is
consistent with the central tradition of Delaware law, which defers to the
informed decisions of impartial directors, especially when those decisions
have been approved by the disinterested stockholders on full information
and without coercion.” 96 The final consideration that led the court to
uphold MFW I was that these dual protections would assure a fair price for
the minority shareholders. Under entire fairness review, obtaining the right
price for minority shareholders is the “preponderant” concern, and the risk
of them not getting the right price in a self-dealing scenario is the major
justification for the heightened standard of review.97 However, since the
dual-protections in play in the instant case would also ensure an acceptable
price for minority shareholders, there is no point of imposing entire fairness
when they are present. 98
Thus, on these grounds, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the legal
standard propounded in MFW I, holding that a going-private merger
conditioned from the outset on approval by both an independent, fully
empowered special committee and an uncoerced, informed majority-of-theminority will be subject to the BJR rather than entire fairness. 99 Applying
this standard to the facts of the case at hand, the Delaware Supreme Court
found in favor of the defendant, MacAndrews. 100 It determined that
MacAndrews indeed conditioned its offer upon dual procedural
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 644-45.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 646-47.
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protections. 101 Also, the special committee used by MacAndrews was truly
independent and effective. 102 Finally, the vote of the majority of the
minority was uncoerced and fully informed. 103 Therefore, with the case
being reviewed through the lens of the BJR, MacAndrews was entitled to
summary judgment. 104
IV.

THE EROSION OF LYNCH: HOW MFW I AND MFW II FIT INTO
THE CASE LAW

Despite first appearances, the MFW opinions are not an aberration.
Although Chancellor Strine and the Delaware Supreme Court broke from
the tradition of entire fairness in controlling-shareholder transactions, MFW
I and II are best understood as a broader undercurrent against the old model
of judicial review underpinned by Lynch. While the influence of Lynch is
still heavy, the footprint that it left in the case law had begun to wear away
before MFW I, particularly within the chancery court.105 Long before MFW
was decided in May 2013, two major and oft-cited opinions, In re Siliconix
Shareholders Litigation 106 and Glassman v. Unocal Exploration
Company, 107 were issued. These cases and their progeny, as well as In re
Cox Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 108 provided a vital
foundation for MFW I and MFW II. Thus, rather than being a monumental,
but sui generis, event, MFW I and MFW II are a culmination of a wider
movement.
A. The Lynch Footprint
Since being decided in 1995, Lynch has cast a shadow across all
transactions involving controlling shareholders. Lynch’s main contribution
to the canon of Delaware case law was clarifying, for a time, what standard
of review applies to a going-private merger that is negotiated by a special
committee of independent members of the subsidiary’s board. The court in
Lynch adopted the position that the presence and activity of the special
committee only shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff within the entire
101. Id. at 654.
102. Id. at 647-53
103. Id. at 653-54.
104. Id. at 654
105. Aside from Unocal, the cases discussed in this section have not been reviewed by
the Delaware Supreme Court.
106. In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del.
Ch. June 19, 2001).
107. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
108. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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fairness analysis and does not afford the defendant the protections of the
BJR. 109 Moreover, the court employed broad language, implying that even
if a majority of the minority shareholders approved the deal negotiated by
the committee, entire fairness would still be the standard of review. It
articulated that “[a] controlling . . . shareholder standing on both sides of a
transaction . . . bears the burden of proving its entire fairness,” and “[e]ntire
fairness remains the proper focus of judicial analysis in examining an
interested merger . . . because the unchanging nature of the underlying
‘interested’ transaction requires careful scrutiny.” 110 These two statements
in conjunction with the court’s declaration that “an approval of the
transaction by an independent committee . . . or an informed majority of
minority shareholders [only] shifts the burden of proof” appeared to
foreclose the BJR even when both measures are taken––a holding contrary
to MFW I and II, and, as later discussed, Cox Communications. 111
Lynch was hardly the first case to entrench entire fairness as the
mainstay in going-private mergers. Entire fairness had been a protection
for minority shareholders since 1952, when the Delaware Supreme Court
held in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corporation112 and Gotlieb v. Heyden
Chemical Corporation 113 that interested transactions with controlling
shareholders can be reassessed by the courts if they believe the price to be
unfair. While there was some debate in the case law before Lynch about
the absoluteness of this rule 114–– a debate that Lynch essentially quashed––
many opinions were steadfast in their commitment to entire fairness. For
example, in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Company, the court affirmed that “[t]he
requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands
on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire
fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.” 115
Thus, Lynch, along with other case law supporting it, has been extremely
influential precedent. But, recently pushback has been developing.

109. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994).
110. Id. at 1115-16.
111. This, of course, hinges on whether the use of “or” in this statement was intentional.
Given the rest of Lynch and the fact that the there was no majority of minority condition in
Lynch (and thus this statement was not relating to the facts at hand), it is difficult to say.
However, “and” may well have been intended.
112. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109 (1952).
113. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (1952).
114. See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 9844, 1988
WL 111271 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988) (holding that if there is a special committee, the BJR
applies rather than entire fairness).
115. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (quoting Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 710).
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B. The Siliconix Line of Cases
In Siliconix, the defendant, Vishay Intertechnology (“Vishay”), sought
to purchase through a tender offer the 19.6% of its subsidiary, Siliconix,
that it did not already own. 116 The consideration for the purchase was to be
in stock. 117 Before the deal could be either accepted or rejected by the
minority shareholders, an individual who held shares in Siliconix sued,
seeking a preliminary injunction.118 He alleged that the Siliconix board
failed to properly analyze the tender offer and make an informed
recommendation to the minority shareholders about whether or not to
accept the offer. 119 The plaintiff also claimed that the board was
responsible for Vishay offering too low of a price, since it did not
adequately reveal the basis for Vishay’s valuations of Siliconix.120 Because
of these failures, the plaintiff contended that Vishay breached its fiduciary
duty to the minority shareholders and that the breach should be reviewed
under entire fairness. 121 The plaintiff asserted that the transaction would
fail entire fairness scrutiny since it was procedurally and substantively
unfair under the Weinberger standard. 122 Accordingly, the court should
impose the requested preliminary injunction against the transaction.123
The court, however, rebuffed the plaintiff’s argument that entire
fairness applies to tender offers and opted instead to apply the BJR.124 In
doing so, the court acknowledged that “[i]t may seem strange that the
scrutiny given to tender offer transactions is less than the scrutiny that may
be given to . . . a merger transaction.” 125 After all, once a parent obtains at
least 90% of its subsidiary’s shares through a tender offer, it will almost
invariably carry out a short-form merger to acquire the remaining 10%.
Thus, for those minority shareholders who do not tender, they may well
“end up in the same position as if . . . [they] had tendered or if the
transaction had been structured as a merger” 126––that is, they will lose their
shares in the subsidiary, possibly against their will.
116. In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *1
(Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
117. Id.
118. Id. at *6.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *12-13.
121. Id. at *6.
122. Id. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (highlighting that
entire fairness has two components: procedural fairness––“fair dealing”––and substantive
fairness––“fair price”).
123. In re Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *6
124. Id.
125. Id. at *7.
126. Id.
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Nevertheless, the court found that, despite Lynch and the convention
of entire fairness for controlling shareholder transactions, entire fairness
was inappropriate because of “two simple concepts.” 127 First, although
minority shareholders who do not tender may lose their shares through a
likely short-form merger anyway, they at least hang onto their shares in the
meantime. 128 Second, tender offers, unlike merger proposals, are made
directly to the minority shareholders, rather than the target’s board.129
Thus, there is no self-dealing in the form of a controller reaching an
agreement with the board it controls.130 Since self-dealing is one
consideration that militates in favor of entire fairness in going-private
mergers, its absence in the tender-offer context renders entire fairness less
appropriate. 131 Another consideration––“fair price”––is also irrelevant in
the tender-offer context because minority shareholders are free to accept or
decline the tender offer according to their individual assessment of its
propriety. 132 In short, the court concluded that “as long as the tender offer
is pursued properly, the free choice of the minority shareholders to reject
the tender offer provides sufficient protection.”133 Thus, Siliconix held, for
the first time ever in Delaware, that entire fairness did not apply to tender
offers. This decision bifurcated the path controlling shareholders must take
to go private. Before Siliconix, a controlling shareholder was, pursuant to
Lynch, confined to a merger subject to entire fairness. However, after
Siliconix, a controlling shareholder could pursue an alternative: a tender
offer subject to the BJR. At once, this limited the reach of Lynch.
The contours of Siliconix were clarified in In re Pure Resources, Inc.,
Shareholders Litigation. 134 Again in the context of a going-private tender
offer, the court considered what standard of review applied.135 The court
held that the mere fact that the controlling shareholder elected to take the
Siliconix path did not liberate it from meaningful judicial review.136 In the
court’s mind, the concerns expressed in Lynch about abuse by controlling
shareholders could only be given “proper effect”––that is, remedied––if
certain safeguards exist.137 Three safeguards are required for entire fairness
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *6. See also Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996)
(finding that the “fair price” requirement of entire fairness does not apply to non-controlling
shareholder tender offers).
133. Id.
134. 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
135. Id. at 424, 433
136. Id. at 444-46.
137. Id. at 445.
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to apply: (1) the tender offer must be bound by a non-waivable majority of
the minority tender condition; (2) the controlling shareholder must promise
to consummate a prompt short-form merger at the same price if it gets more
than 90% of the shares; and (3) the controller must not make any
These safeguards provide “equitable
“retributive threats.” 138
reinforcement” to the potential for coercion and unfairness posed by
controlling-shareholder transactions.139
The court in In re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders Litigation further
reinforced the shift away from entire fairness.140 There, the court added
another requirement to the three mandated by Pure Resources: if a
controlling shareholder seeks entire fairness for its going-private tender
offer, the tender offer must also be negotiated and recommended by a
Importantly, the
special committee of independent directors.141
subsidiary’s board needs to confer onto the special committee authority
comparable to what it would have in a third-party transaction, where there
is no controlling shareholder. This includes the authority to seek different
transactions and to adopt a rights plan “to provide the subsidiary with time
to respond, negotiate, and develop alternatives” to the tender offer. 142 Such
authority is vital to protecting the minority shareholders. 143
C. Cox Communications
Whereas Siliconix, Pure Resources, and CNX Gas addressed the
standard of review for tender offers by controlling shareholders, Cox
Communications 144 moved the debate squarely to going-private mergers. In
the case, the Cox Family (“the Family”) controlled 74% of Cox
Communications. 145 By summer 2004, the Family decided it would seek
the remaining shares that it did not own and take Cox private again.146
After a meeting with the Cox board in which the Family previewed its
ambitions, the Family made it clear that it would require a special
committee of independent directors to respond to and negotiate its
impending proposal. 147 The Family did not make any threats about what

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010).
Id. at 413.
Id. at 415.
Id.
879 A.2d 604 (Del Ch. 2005).
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id.
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would happen if the special committee rejected the deal.148 On the same
day that the proposal was announced, August 2, 2004, the minority
shareholders sued Cox and the Family, alleging breaches of fiduciary
duty. 149 The allegations centered on the notions that the Family had
undervalued Cox and was trying to enrich itself, and that Cox’s board was
merely acquiescing to the Family’s suspect wishes. 150 Amidst the
litigation, Cox’s board formed the special committee as demanded by the
Family’s proposal. 151 After lengthy negotiations, the Family reached an
agreement for $34.75/share, up from the initial offer of $32/share.152 The
agreement was conditioned on approval by a majority of the minority
shareholders and a settlement of all outstanding lawsuits. 153 While there
were no objections by any party to the settlement, several minority
shareholders challenged the plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees, which
amounted to millions of dollars, and, as part of the settlement, the Family
agreed not to oppose. 154
While the court’s opinion on the attorneys’ fees, authored by
Chancellor Strine, is irrelevant here, it is noteworthy how the court, in
dicta, used this issue as a platform for inveighing against the system of
judicial review for going-private mergers. The court’s remarks were
prompted by its perception that Lynch generates undue litigation costs for
defendants––plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees being one such example. 155 The
court acknowledged that Lynch created a “useful incentive” for controlling
shareholders to use a special committee to negotiate going-private mergers,
since use of the committee shifts the burden within entire fairness to the
plaintiffs. 156 Yet the court lamented how Lynch simultaneously disincentivized the use of a majority of the minority voting condition, because
fulfilling such a condition would not yield any benefits to the controlling
shareholder. 157 After all, entire fairness would still apply. 158 As the court
described, “[f]rom a controller’s standpoint, accepting this condition from
the inception of the negotiating process added an element of transactional
148. Id.
149. Id. at 608.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 609.
152. Id. at 612.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 612-13.
155. Id. at 614-15.
156. Id. at 618.
157. Id.
158. Although Lynch did not expressly state this, that has been the conventional
understanding and, of course, it would be risky and expensive for a controller to hold itself
out as a “test balloon” to see if it holds true. Hence, the special committee-only model for
going-private mergers became entrenched.
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risk without much liability-insulating compensation in exchange.”159 Lynch
thus generated a world in which special committees alone are used in
going-private mergers. 160 This is not ideal for minority shareholders, since
they are less protected than they might otherwise be.
Furthermore, it is not ideal for defendants––the next point that the
court drives home. Because entire fairness, by its very nature, demands a
highly invasive judicial inquiry into the fairness of the price the controlling
shareholder offered the minority shareholders, upon being sued, the
controlling shareholder cannot even get the most unmeritorious cases
dismissed. 161 A plaintiff, simply by claiming that the price was unfair, can
survive a motion to dismiss, “because financial fairness is a debatable issue
and the plaintiff has at least a colorable position.”162 Accordingly, it is
rational for controlling shareholders to simply settle, since it would likely
be cheaper than covering the costs of bringing the case up to summary
judgment––costs that include the waste of executives’ time. 163
The solution, in Chancellor Strine’s estimation, was exactly what he
had a chance to rule on in MFW I: when a merger with a controlling
shareholder is (1) negotiated and approved by a special committee of
independent directors and (2) conditioned on an affirmative vote of a
majority of the minority stockholders, the court should apply the BJR. 164
Although in Cox Communications this prescription was contained only
within dicta, it exerted deep influence on the practical answer to standard of
review question. Beyond, of course, MFW I, the court in CNX Gas
explicitly stated that it had applied Chancellor Strine’s recommendation in
Cox Communications to arrive at its conclusion that a tender offer will be
subject to the BJR if, among other things, it is conditioned on the existence
of a special, independent committee and approval by a majority of the
minority shareholders. 165 It did so despite the obvious fact that Cox
Communications did not speak to the same set of facts––CNX Gas tackled
a tender offer––and, regardless, one chancery court opinion is not binding
upon another.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 620.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 606.
In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 400 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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D. Unocal
Unocal also chipped away the edifice constructed by Lynch in the
merger context. In Unocal, the court considered what standard of review
applied to a “short-form” merger. 166 Short-form mergers, which are
governed by Section 253 of the Delaware Corporate Law, permit a
controlling shareholder that owns at least 90% of the shares of a subsidiary
to merge the subsidiary into itself through a simple administrative process,
thereby removing the minority shareholders. 167 The plaintiffs, who were
minority shareholders in UXC––Unocal’s 96%-owned subsidiary––
challenged the short-form merger between Unocal and UXC, arguing that
Unocal and its directors on UXC’s board did not engage in fair dealing. 168
Mindful of Lynch’s warnings about abuse by controlling shareholders in
interested transactions, the court was confronted with the choice of either
limiting the breadth of Lynch or possibly defeating the legislature’s purpose
in creating the short-form merger: providing controlling shareholders with
an expedited process for squeezing out minority shareholders.169 Whatever
the ostensible sweep of Lynch, the court ruled that entire fairness did not
apply. 170 Accordingly, controlling shareholders in short-form mergers
would be freed from complying with the procedural demands of entire
fairness, such as setting up a negotiating committee and hiring independent
financial and legal experts––procedures that help protect minority
shareholders.
V.

DESIRABLE RESISTANCE: WHY MFW I AND II GOT IT RIGHT

The previous section described how MFW I and II, despite first
appearances, were not a one-off challenge to Lynch, but rather the most
graphic illustration of broader resistance to Lynch’s influence. Now, I will
shift from the positive to the normative. The Delaware Supreme Court
properly upheld MFW I for three reasons. First, it bridges the deep divide
between the treatment of going-private tender offers and going-private
mergers. Second, it incentivizes a going-private merger structure that is
optimal for minority shareholders. Third, it will inevitably initiate a
positive change in the realm of securities litigation by reducing frivolous

166. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2001).
167. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253 (2010) (stating, “by executing, acknowledging and
filing . . . a certificate of such ownership and merger setting forth a copy of the resolution of
its board of directors to so merge and the date of the adoption”).
168. Unocal, 777 A.2d at 244.
169. Id. at 247-48.
170. Id.
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lawsuits. Therefore, the Delaware Supreme Court correctly upheld
Chancellor Strine’s opinion.
A. Doctrinal Coherence
The first reason that MFW should be upheld is to reconcile the
doctrinal tension between Lynch, on the one hand, and the Siliconix line of
cases, on the other. As discussed, there are dramatic differences between
entire fairness and the BJR. 171 Yet there are not dramatic differences
between a going-private merger and a going-private tender offer followed
by a short-form merger––in fact, they are practically similar.172 Thus, the
tension becomes: why are comparable transactions reviewed under
radically different standards? The court itself in Pure Resources, which
built on Siliconix, was “troubled by [this] imbalance in Delaware
law . . . .” 173 In In re Cysive, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the court called
the imbalance downright “strange.” 174 Delaware’s application of entire
fairness to mergers and the BJR to tender offers is disconcerting from the
uncontroversial standpoint that the law should make sense and not be
arbitrary. However, the concern is not purely academic; if Lynch was
motivated by worries that controlling shareholders may exercise their
power to the detriment of minority shareholders, and the Siliconix line of
cases, while departing from Lynch, also expressed that same fear, then one
would hope that minority shareholders would be amply protected by the
courts whatever method of going private was chosen.
Although CNX Gas made significant headway in protecting minority
shareholders in the tender offer context by holding that the BJR would only
apply if: (1) the tender offer is negotiated and recommended by a special
committee of independent directors; (2) the tender offer is conditioned on
majority of the minority approval; (3) the controlling shareholder
consummates a prompt short-form merger at the same price if it gets more
than 90% of the shares; and (4) the controller does not make any retributive

171. See supra Section I (discussing the differences between the BJR and entire fairness
standards of review).
172. See, e.g., In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL
716787, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (noting how the “[minority] shareholders may reject
the tender, but, if the tender is successful and the short-form merger accomplished, the
shareholder . . . will end up in the same position as if he or she had tendered or if the
transaction had been structured as a merger . . . .”) (emphasis added); Ronald J. Gilson &
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 824
n.160 (2003) (flagging the “thinness of the distinction between the transactional
forms . . . .”).
173. In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 443 (Del. Ch. 2002).
174. In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 547 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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threats, 175 there remained a disconnect with the judiciary’s treatment of
mergers. If the transaction being negotiated and recommended by a
special, independent committee and approved by the majority of the
minority was sufficient to insulate the minority shareholders from the
controller’s abuse in the tender offer context, why would these procedures
not do the same for minority shareholders in a going-private merger?
The answer is that they should. Thus, MFW II, in declaring that a
going-private merger negotiated and accepted by a special committee and
approved by a majority of the minority is subject to the BJR, bridges the
doctrinal divide between Lynch and the Siliconix line of cases. Unifying
the two sides is the principle that, when these measures are taken,
regardless of what form the transaction takes, the controlling shareholder
and the controlled board have replicated an “arm’s-length” bargain and
thus the transaction is not conflicted and does not constitute self-dealing.
Accordingly, the BJR should apply, just as it applies in situations in which
the takeover is being attempted by a third party. 176
Relatedly, MFW II provided the Delaware Supreme Court with an
opportunity to whole-heartedly join the movement against Lynch and quell
the uncertainty at the chancery court about what the supreme court might
do with the chancery court’s decisions in this area. With the exception of
Unocal, the supreme court had not spoken on the derogation of Lynch’s
authority begot by the Siliconix line of cases, among others. With the
doctrinal incoherence having simmered for years, the court, by upholding
MFW I, put its seal of approval on Chancellor Strine’s solution. Had the
Delaware Supreme Court overruled MFW I and blessed the differing
treatment of going-private tender offers and going-private mergers, then
Delaware would be left with a distinction in the law that is unjustified.
Therefore, MFW I was properly upheld.
B. Protecting Minority Shareholders
The second reason that it was beneficial for the Delaware Supreme
Court to endorse MFW I is that it creates an incentive to structure mergers
in a manner optimally protective of minority shareholders. Based on the
standard reading of Lynch, with its expansive statements about the
propriety of entire fairness for self-dealing transactions, controlling
shareholders believed that entire fairness would apply regardless of what
measures they took in going-private mergers. Moreover, based on this
175. In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 413 (Del. Ch. 2010).
176. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
(recognizing that “the business judgment rule, including the standards by which director
conduct is judged, is applicable in the context of a [non-controlling shareholder] takeover”).
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same reading, if a going-private merger was negotiated and recommended
by a special, independent committee and approved by the majority of the
minority, the controlling shareholder would be in no better position than if
the committee alone had endorsed the deal; either way, the controlling
shareholder would face entire fairness and the burden would merely be
shifted to the plaintiff.177 Thus, as the court noted in Cox Communications,
“[a]s a practical matter . . . the effect of Lynch in the real world . . . was to
generate the use of special committees alone.”178
However, minority shareholders would certainly benefit from the dual
protections prescribed in Cox Communications and found to be sufficient to
warrant the BJR in MFW I. The power of a special negotiating committee
as a formidable roadblock to controlling shareholder abuse has long been
appreciated, including, of course, by the Delaware Supreme Court. In
Weinberger, for example, where the controlling shareholder did not use a
special committee to negotiate the going-private merger, the court lamented
that “the result here could have been entirely different if [the controller]
had appointed an independent negotiating committee,” since that would be
equivalent to “conduct by a theoretical, wholly independent, board of
directors . . . exerting its bargaining power against the other at arm’s
length . . . .” 179 Approval by the majority of the minority is also powerful,
though not dispositive, in its own right. Combined with MFW’s
requirement that the controlling shareholder cannot coerce the minority
shareholders if it seeks the fruits of the BJR,180 the vote provides an
effective check on the special committee––a safeguard against the peril that
the committee either erred in its judgment or was somehow suborned by
the controller.
Furthermore, as the court expounded in Cox Communications, a
going-private merger blessed both by the independent directors and the
majority of the minority is vital, since [the two are] complementary and not
substitutes. The first element is important because the directors have the
capability to act as effective and active bargaining agents, which
disaggregated shareholders do not. But, because bargaining agents are not

177. See supra Section IV.A (discussing the “Lynch Footprint”); see also Guhan
Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 17 (2005) (concluding that, “from a
transactional lawyer’s perspective, merger-freezeout doctrine after Lynch . . . represents the
worst of all possible worlds: a fully empowered [special committee] and a feisty negotiation
with the controller, to be followed nevertheless with entire fairness review by the court,
even if minority shareholders have approved the deal”).
178. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 619 (Del. Ch. 2005).
179. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983).
180. In re MFW S’holder Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 536 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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always effective or faithful, the second element is critical, because it gives
the minority stockholders the opportunity to reject their agents’ work. 181
Even the MFW plaintiffs acknowledged that this transactional
structure is the ideal one for minority stockholders.182 Thus, the
combination of safeguards, incentivized by MFW I, is a particularly potent
force in protecting minority shareholders. Given that the combination
would continue to not be used if the Delaware Supreme Court had
overruled MFW I and held that the BJR always applies in going-private
mergers, the Delaware Supreme Court made the correct decision––one that
will inherently ward off abuse by controlling shareholders.
C. Changing the Landscape of Securities Litigation
The third reason that the outcome in MFW II is desirable is that it will
positively transform the landscape of securities litigation. One effect of the
standard interpretation of Lynch––that the standard of review should
always be entire fairness for going-private mergers––was that it enabled
frivolous lawsuits. The dilemma was that, when a plaintiff sued, alleging
that a going-private merger was unfair, it was virtually impossible for the
defendant to make the case go away at the pleading stage. This is because
of the “factual intensiveness of the financial fairness determination,” which
“will generally preclude dismissal or [even] summary judgment in such
cases.” 183 Any allegation that the transaction is not fair will survive a
motion to dismiss, since it raises a triable issue of fact, and under Lynch,
there is no need to plead particularized facts demonstrating unfairness.
Summary judgment was also similarly hopeless for the defendant. As
the court commented in Cysive, “the determination of whether the burden
should shift under the Lynch doctrine is the kind of decision that can
usually be made . . . at the earliest, on undisputed facts that have emerged
from a discovery record.” 184 At the summary judgment stage, where all
inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party based on that record,
it is highly improbable that the controlling shareholder would be able to
convince that court, for example, that there is zero dispute whether the
special committee had real bargaining power, whether the committee was
unduly influenced by the controller, and whether the committee complied
with its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. 185
Hence, every single case, however unmeritorious, has settlement
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 606.
Id. at 527.
In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 548 n.19 (Del. Ch. 2003).
Id. at 548.
Id.
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value. That the terms of a going-private merger are irrelevant to whether
litigation is brought is poignantly illustrated by the fact that plaintiffs, as a
matter of course, sue long before the committee has agreed to or even
received the controlling shareholder’s proposed terms. 186 Thus, plaintiff
firms reflexively file suit when the controller merely makes public its
intention to propose a deal, using almost entirely boilerplate complaints,
which they later have to amend to incorporate the actual details of the
proposal. The reflexive nature of the exercise is further confirmed by the
fact that, in 2012, multiple shareholder suits were brought to challenge 93%
of M&A deals with a value over $100 million, and 96% of M&A deals
with a value over $500 million.187 While some of these suits undoubtedly
have merit, it utterly strains credulity that unfairness is near universal to
such transactions, especially when the defendants would know in advance
that plaintiff firms would be watching their every move.
That the terms of a going-private merger do not matter is further
verified by the fact that plaintiffs universally acquiesce to whatever price
per share the special committee agrees to with the controlling
shareholder. 188 They do so by accepting the price as part of the litigation
settlement and signing a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”)
declaring that the price is fair.189 To appreciate the farcical nature of this
practice, the ritualistic process of challenging a going-private merger must
be further highlighted. The process is as follows: a plaintiff sues when the
controlling shareholders’ intention to go private is announced; naturally,
the controlling shareholder, when it initially offers a price for its subsidiary,
does not offer the maximum that it would be willing to pay, since that
would weaken its negotiating position; after negotiating with the special

186. See, e.g., ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1 (2012), available at
https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/9d8fd78f-7807-485a-a8fc4ec4182dedd6/2012-Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-M-and-A.pdf (finding that in 2012,
M&A shareholder suits were filed an average of fourteen days after the merger
announcement and sometimes “within hours” of the merger announcement); see also In re
Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 620 (Del. Ch. 2005) (observing that,
“Instead of suing once a controller actually signs up a merger agreement with a special
committee of independent directors, plaintiffs sue as soon as there is a public announcement
of the controller’s intention to propose a merger”––something that is “typical.”)
187. Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 620. This figure includes M&A deals in which there
are not controlling shareholders. Since the presence of a controller makes it that much more
likely that the deal would be challenged, these figures for going-private mergers would
likely be even higher.
188. Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware
Law (Mis)shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1817 (2004) (noting
that shareholders typically “go[] through the motions”).
189. Id. at 1818.
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committee, the price that the controlling shareholder agrees to pay is
always higher than its initial offer; because the price paid is higher than the
price proposed, the plaintiffs’ attorneys contend that their suit is
responsible for the difference and thus their suit benefited the minority
shareholders; the controlling shareholder and plaintiffs’ attorneys, as part
of the settlement, sign a MOU stating that the plaintiffs’ attorneys deserve
credit for the increase and that the price paid is indeed fair; and, finally, the
court will award attorney’s fees based on this “added value” that the
plaintiffs’ attorneys generated. 190
The plaintiffs’ attorneys have no incentive to further challenge the
fairness of the price agreed to by the special committee, because they
would have little or nothing to gain from doing so, and their costs––in the
form of time and effort trying to convince the court that the price was
unfair––are significant. 191 Thus, the plaintiffs do not care whether the price
agreed to is fair. They only care that the price is higher than what was
proposed after they filed suit, since that is what will form the foundation
for their fees!
Accordingly, as Elliot Weiss and Lawrence White bluntly put it,
Lynch “appears to have had the effect of encouraging plaintiffs’ attorneys
to settle cases challenging squeeze outs, largely without regard to whether
the merger terms agreed to by a [special negotiating committee] are entirely
fair.” 192 Indeed, as the court in Cox Communications noted, despite its
challenge to the instant plaintiffs to do so, they were unable “to point to one
instance in the precise context of a case of this kind (i.e. cases started by
attacks on negotiable going-private proposals) of the plaintiffs’ lawyers
refusing to settle once a special committee has agreed on price with a
controller.” 193 They were unable, because “in every instance, the plaintiffs’
lawyers have concluded that the price obtained by the special committee
was sufficiently attractive, that the acceptance of a settlement at that price
was warranted.” 194 Thus, the pre-MFW litigation framework facilitated “an
implicitly collusive settlement in which plaintiffs’ attorneys, in exchange
for defendants’ virtual guaranty of a fee award, agree to sign off on merger
terms that at least arguably are unfair and that they might otherwise be
successful in challenging.” 195

190. See, e.g., id. at 1815-19 (describing these aspects of the process of challenging
going-private mergers); Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 621-22 (same).
191. Weiss & White, supra note 189, at 1819.
192. Weiss & White, supra note 188, at 1857 n.183.
193. Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 621.
194. Id.
195. Weiss & White, supra note 188, at 1818.

WILSON_FINAL (ARTICLE 7) .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

DESIRABLE RESISTANCE

3/26/2015 5:47 PM

669

Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys are not fighting for a fair deal for
minority shareholders. They settle when it is profitable for them to do so––
not when the minority shareholders obtain the price that they deserve under
Delaware law. Sometimes these two things can converge, as is the case
when the attorneys settle according to the price that the special committee
agreed to and that price happens to be entirely fair. However, unless these
two things always converge, the pre-MFW practice of invariably settling
according to the agreed-to price represented a selling out of the minority
shareholders’ interests in favor of their lawyers. If the lawyers were
concerned about the fairness of the transaction, one would expect to
witness at least some situations in which the plaintiffs’ attorneys reject the
agreed-to price, refuse to settle, and continue their fight for a better deal.
But these situations do not exist. Thus, the standard interpretation of
Lynch, which was challenged by MFW I, was responsible for a litigation
system in which suits were brought to attack nearly all going-private
mergers involving controlling shareholders, but the beneficiaries are the
lawyers rather than the minority shareholders.
By upholding MFW I, the Delaware Supreme Court helped correct
these serious woes of shareholder litigation arising from going-private
mergers.
Pursuant to Chancellor Strine’s opinion, the BJR will
presumptively apply at the pleading stage if the controller conditions its
going-private merger on approval by a fully empowered special committee
and a majority of the minority shareholders. The plaintiffs will then have
the burden of pleading facts sufficient to rebut the BJR. 196 Thus, to survive
a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff will need to plead particularized facts
indicating gross negligence or that MFW I’s procedural requirements were
not met. The latter could be done by pleading particularized facts
indicating that: the controlling shareholder did not condition from the
outset the procession of the deal on approval by a special committee and
the majority of the minority shareholders; the special committee was not
independent; the committee was not adequately empowered to say no; the
committee was not informed; or that the minority was coerced.197 Since
this is far more difficult for a plaintiff to do compared to his burden under
entire fairness, MFW II creates a desirable filtering mechanism early in the
litigation. Lawsuits will no longer have settlement value purely because
there is no feasible way for the controlling shareholder to get them
dismissed on the pleadings.
Emanating from this will be a reduction in the number of frivolous
lawsuits. No longer can plaintiffs’ attorneys file suit when a controlling
196. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009).
197. See In re MFW S’holders. Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 535 (Del. Ch. 2013) (listing the
necessary conditions for invoking the business judgment rule).
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shareholder’s bare intention to go private is announced. They will be
forced to wait until the terms of the deal are revealed and then assess
whether the terms are indeed unfair. To do otherwise would be to invite
financial ruin, as they would be investing time and energy into far too
many suits that would be dismissed and thus not generate returns of any
sort. Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys now need to care about if the goingprivate merger’s terms are actually fair or not. They can no longer afford
to bring suit independent of the merits of their claims and burden
defendants who, in fact, did nothing wrong.
Moreover, because only non-frivolous lawsuits can survive a motion
to dismiss under the BJR, the defendant controlling shareholder responsible
for the challenged transaction will feel pressure to pay more to obtain the
minority shareholders’ stock. As discussed, the current practice is for
plaintiffs’ attorneys to file suit whenever there is a going-private merger
proposed, wait until the special committee reaches an agreement about
price with the controlling shareholder, and then reach a settlement with the
controlling shareholder based on that price.198 In exchange for settling, the
plaintiffs’ attorneys, without exception, declare that the price is fair and the
controlling shareholder declares that the plaintiffs’ attorneys are
responsible for the difference between the lower price proposed initially
and the higher agreed-upon price. If only meritorious suits––or suits that
have a reasonable potential to be found meritorious––survived a motion to
dismiss, the controlling shareholders would be compelled to offer more
favorable terms. They could not rest assured, as they do now, that
whatever terms they extract from the special committee are to be blessed
by the plaintiffs’ attorneys.
CONCLUSION
MFW I brought the brewing conflict between Lynch and the Siliconix
line of cases to a climax. Now, the Delaware Supreme Court has ruled on
the issue. The basic question was what standard of review applies when a
going-private merger is (1) negotiated and recommended by a special,
independent committee and (2) approved by the majority of the minority
shareholders. Yet, bound up in the answer to the question was a variety of
important issues, such as the doctrinal coherence of Delaware case law on
going-private tender offers and mergers, the level of protection afforded to
minority shareholders, and the fate of this arena of securities litigation.
This comment has argued that the Delaware Supreme Court was shrewd in
upholding Chancellor Strine’s opinion in MFW I, since doing so was

198.

See supra text accompanying note 190.
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beneficial on all three of these fronts. First, upholding MFW I reconciled
the long-brewing tension between the Siliconix line of cases, which
supports the BJR in the context of tender offers, and the Lynch line of
cases, which supports entire fairness in the context of going-private
mergers. It did so by setting a bold new precedent at the highest level in
Delaware: the BJR is the appropriate standard of review for both tender
offers and going-private mergers, so long as they abide by certain
procedural requirements to ward off coercion. This precedent ends the
uncertainty that existed at the chancery court on these matters, and affirms
the sound principle that practically similar transactions should not be
treated radically differently under the law.
Second, by upholding MFW I, the Delaware Supreme Court
incentivized controlling shareholders to structure their going-private
mergers in a manner maximally protective of minority shareholders. If
controllers conditioned their going-private mergers on approval by both a
special, fully empowered, independent committee and the majority of the
minority shareholders, controllers would benefit from the BJR––a standard
of review that they cannot benefit from now. Therefore, controllers would
want to take these measures, which each uniquely mitigate the risk of
abuse. Finally, the MFW II decision will improve securities litigation.
Since entire fairness had, since Lynch, been entrenched as the standard of
review for going-private mergers, the reality was that virtually any lawsuit
challenging such mergers could survive a motion to dismiss. Therefore,
every single one of these lawsuits had settlement value to plaintiffs’
attorneys, since they knew that the defendant controlling shareholders
would rather pay to make the case go away than to fight them through the
discovery stage and beyond. This led to the proliferation of frivolous
lawsuits. However, if, as MFW II now commands, the BJR is the standard
of review and presumptively applies at the pleadings stage, the mere
allegation of unfairness does not suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss.
Instead, plaintiffs need to plead with particularity facts that indicate that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duties and that the transaction cannot
be attributed to any legitimate business purpose. This filter ensures that
only cases that are meritorious or likely to be meritorious would proceed to
the discovery stage. Given these advantages to upholding MFW I, the
Delaware Supreme Court was correct to do so.
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